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Abstract—Over the last few years, a rapidly increasing number
of Internet-of-Things (IoT) systems that adopt voice as the
primary user input have emerged. These systems have been
shown to be vulnerable to various types of voice spoofing
attacks. However, how exactly these techniques differ or relate
to each other has not been extensively studied. In this paper,
we provide a survey of recent attack and defense techniques for
voice controlled systems and propose a classification of these
techniques. We also discuss the need for a universal defense
strategy that protects a system from various types of attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of IoT systems rely on voice input
as the primary user-machine interface. For example, voice-
controlled devices such as Amazon Echo, Google Home,
Apple HomePod, and Xiaomi AI allow users to control their
smart home appliances, adjust thermostats, activate home
security systems, purchase items online, initiate phone calls,
and complete many other tasks with ease. In addition, most
smartphones are also equipped with smart voice assistants such
as Siri, Google Now, and Cortana, which provide a convenient
and natural user interface to control smartphone functionality
or IoT devices. Voice-driven user interfaces allow hands-free
and eyes-free operation where users can interact with a system
while focusing their attention elsewhere. A block diagram of
a typical voice controlled system (VCS) is shown in Figure 1.
Despite their convenience, VCSs also raise new security
concerns. One such concern is their vulnerability to a voice
replay attack [1], i.e., an attacker can replay a previously
recorded voice to make the IoT system perform a specific
malicious action. Such malicious actions include the opening
and unlocking of doors, making unauthorized purchases, con-
trolling sensitive home appliances (e.g., security cameras and
thermostats), and transmitting sensitive information. While a
simple voice replay attack is relatively easy to detect by a user,
and therefore presents only a limited threat, recent studies have
pointed out more concerning and effective types of attacks,
including self-triggered attacks [2], [3], inaudible attacks [4],
[5], and human-imperceptible attacks [6], [7], [8]. These
attacks are very different from each other in terms of their
implementation, which requires different domain knowledge
in areas such as the operating system, signal processing,
and machine learning. However, how exactly they differ or
relate to each other has not been extensively studied. As a
consequence, to the best of our knowledge, current defense
techniques only aim to defend attacks of one specific category,
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Fig. 1. An illustration of a typical voice controlled system. The device
captures the human voice, converts it into a digital speech signal, and feeds
it into a machine learning model. The corresponding command is then
executed by the connected IoT devices. Potential points of attack in this
scenario include: 1©: spoofing the system using previously recorded audio,
2©: hacking into the operating system to force the voice-driven software to
accept commands erroneously, 3©: emitting carefully designed illegitimate
analog signals that will be converted into legitimate digital speech signals by
the hardware, and 4©: using carefully crafted speech adversarial examples to
fool the machine learning model.
with the assumption that the defender knows the details of the
attacking technology. From a security standpoint, this is deeply
unsatisfactory. Therefore, in this paper, we provide a survey of
recent attack and defense techniques for voice controlled sys-
tems, discuss their relationships, and propose a classification
of these techniques. We further discuss a potential universal
defense strategy for different types of attacks. We expect that
the analysis and discussion in this paper will provide useful
insights for future studies and efforts in building secure voice-
driven IoT systems.
II. VOICE-BASED ATTACKS
With the rapidly growing popularity and functionality of
voice-driven IoT devices, the potential of voice-based attacks
becomes a non-negligible security risk. As discussed in [9],
[2], [10], an attack may lead to severe losses, e.g., a burglar
could enter a house by tricking a voice-based smart lock or
an attacker could make unauthorized purchases and credit card
charges using a voice-based system. Such attacks can be very
simple and often difficult or even impossible to detect by
humans and voice attacks can be hidden by other sounds or
embedded into audio and video recordings. Further, it is also
very easy to scale up such attacks, e.g., a hidden malicious
audio sample in a YouTube video could simultaneously target
millions of devices.
Although the implementations of existing attack techniques
may be very different, their goals are the same: generating a
signal that leads a voice controlled system to execute a specific
malicious command that the user cannot detect or recognize.
In the following sections, we first introduce representative
state-of-the-art attack approaches according to the type of
implementation. We then further discuss the positives and
negatives of each approach and how they relate to each other.
The attacker performance discussed in this section is evaluated
and reported by the original publication. Due to rapid changes
of cloud-based systems, the attacker performance is also likely
to change over time.
A. Attack Classification Based On Implementation
1) Basic Voice Replay Attack: It is widely known that
voice controlled systems are vulnerable to voice replay attacks,
i.e., an attacker can replay a previously recorded voice to
make a system perform a specific action [1], [13], e.g.,
as demonstrated previously with the popular Amazon Alexa
technology [10]. A shortcoming of the basic voice replay
attack is that it is easy to detect and therefore has a limited
practical impact. Nevertheless, as shown later in this section,
voice replay attacks are the basis of other more advanced and
dangerous attacks.
2) Operating System Level Attack: Compared to basic voice
replay attacks, an operating system (OS) level attack exploits
vulnerabilities of the OS to make the attack self-triggered and
more imperceptible. Representative examples of this are the
A11y attack [3], GVS-Attack [2], and the approach presented
in [9]. In [3], the authors propose a malware that collects
a user’s voice and then performs a self-replay attack as a
background service. In [2], the authors further verify that the
built-in microphone and speaker can be used simultaneously
and that the use of the speaker does not require user permission
on Android devices. They take advantage of this and propose
a zero-permission malware, which continuously analyzes the
environment and conducts the attack once it finds that no
user is nearby. The attack uses the device’s built-in speaker to
replay a recorded or synthetic speech, which is then accepted
as a legitimate command. This self-triggered attack is thus
more dangerous and practical. While this attack can still
be detected by the user, the authors point out that if the
malware has high permissions, it is even possible for it to
import an audio file to the microphone without playing it,
which can make the attack completely inaudible. In [9], the
authors analyze the permission vulnerability to the voice attack
in detail and propose an approach to bypass the permission
management of the Android system. The authors also find that
some malicious actions require a multiple-step command and
further propose an interactive attack that can execute more
advanced commands.
3) Hardware Level Attack: A hardware level attack replays
a synthetic non-speech analog signal instead of human voice.
The analog signal is carefully designed according to the char-
acteristics of the hardware (e.g., the analog-digital converter).
The signal is inaudible, but can be converted into a legiti-
mate digital speech signal by the hardware. Representative
approaches are the Dolphin attack [4] and the IEMI attack [5].
In [4], the authors utilize the non-linearity of a Micro Electro
Mechanical Systems (MEMS) microphone over ultrasounds
and successfully generate inaudible ultrasound signals that
can be accepted as legitimate target commands. Generating
such ultrasound signals requires a special device that includes
a controller (e.g., another smartphone), an amplifier, and an
ultrasonic transducer. The longest attack distance is 175cm.
In [5], the authors take advantage of the fact that a wired
microphone-capable headphone can be used as a microphone
and an FM antenna simultaneously and demonstrate that it
is possible to trigger voice commands remotely by emitting
a carefully designed inaudible AM-modulated signal. This
attack is only effective when the wired headphone is plugged
into the device. A limitation of hardware level attacks is that
generating the attack signal requires special devices, and also
some preconditions must be met (e.g., the victim device needs
to be in the attack range and the microphone needs to be
plugged in). While the synthetic signal is inaudible to the user,
the signal generator might still be noticed by the user.
Machine LearningHuman Voice Human Voice
‘Duck’ ‘Horse’ h0.07
+  
‘How are you?’ h0.01 ‘Open the door’ 
 +
Fig. 2. An illustration of machine learning adversarial examples. Studies
have shown that by adding an imperceptibly small, but carefully designed
perturbation, an attack can successfully lead the machine learning model to
making a wrong prediction. Such attacks have been used in computer vision
(upper graphs) [14] and speech recognition (lower graphs) [12], [7], [8].
4) Machine Learning Level Attack: State-of-the-art voice
controlled systems are usually equipped with an automatic
speech recognition (ASR) algorithm to convert digital speech
signal to text. Deep neural network (DNN) based algorithms
such as DeepSpeech [15] can achieve excellent performance
with around 95% word recognition rate and hence dominate
the field. However, recent studies show that machine learning
models, especially DNN based models, are vulnerable to
attacks by adversarial examples [14]. That is, machine learning
models might mis-classify perturbed examples that are only
slightly different from correctly classified examples (illustrated
in Figure 2). In speech, adversarial samples can sound like
normal speech, but will actually be recognized as a completely
different malicious command by the machine, e.g., an audio
file might sound like “hello”, but will be recognized as “open
the door” by the ASR system. In recent years, several examples
of such attacks have been studied [6], [7], [8], [11], [12], [16].
Cocaine Noodles [11] and Hidden Voice Command [6]
are the first efforts to utilize the differences in the way
humans and computers recognize speech and to successfully
generate adversarial sound examples that are intelligible as a
specific command to ASR systems (Google Now and CMU
Sphinx), but are not easily understandable by humans. The
authors observe that ASR systems rely on acoustic features
(e.g., Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients or MFCC) extracted
from the audio. Therefore, their attack mangles a malicious
TABLE I
REPRESENTATIVE VOICE ATTACK TECHNIQUES
Attack Name Attack Type Adversary’s Knowledge Implementation
GVS Attack [2] Operating System White box Continuously analyze the environment and conduct voice replay attack
using built-in microphone when opportunities arise.
A11y Attack [3] Operating System White box Collect the voice of a user and conduct self-replay attack as a
background service.
Monkey Attack [9] Operating System White box Bypass authority management of the OS and conduct interactive voice
replay attack to execute more advanced commands.
Dolphin Attack [4] Hardware White box Emit ultrasound signal that can be converted into a legitimate speech
digital signal by the MEMS microphone.
IEMI Attack [5] Hardware White box Emit AM-modulated signal that can be converted into a legitimate
speech digital signal by the wired microphone-capable headphone.
Cocaine Noodles [11] Machine Learning Black box Similar to the hidden voice command.
Hidden Voice Command [6] Machine Learning Black & White box Mangle malicious voice commands so that it retains enough acoustic
features for the ASR system, but becomes unintelligible to humans.
Houdini [12] Machine Learning Black & White box Produce sound that is almost no different to normal speech, but fails
to be recognized by both known or unknown ASR systems.
Speech Adversarial Example [7] Machine Learning White box Produce sound that is over 98% similar to any given speech, but makes
the DNN model fail to recognize the gender, identity, and emotion.
Targeted Speech Adversarial Ex-
ample [8]
Machine Learning White box Produce sound that is over 99.9% similar to any given speech, but
transcribes as any desired malicious command by the ASR.
voice command signal in such a way that it retains enough
acoustic features for the ASR system to accept it while making
it difficult for humans to understand. The limitation of the
approach in [11], [6] is that the generated audio does not
sound like legitimate speech. As a matter of fact, strictly
speaking, Cocaine Noodles and Hidden Voice Commands are
not really machine learning adversarial examples, because they
use sounds that are not similar to legitimate speech [17]. A
user might notice that the malicious sound is an abnormal
condition and may take counteractions. Further, generating
such adversary examples requires a subjective human test step
to ensure that it is imperceptible by humans, which makes the
approach not fully automated.
In contrast to [11], [6], more recent efforts [12], [7], [8] take
advantage of an intriguing property of DNN by generating
malicious audio that sounds almost completely like normal
speech by adopting a mathematical optimization method. The
goal of these techniques is to design a minor perturbation in the
speech signal that can fool an ASR system. In [8], the authors
propose a method that can produce an audio waveform that
is less than 0.1% different from a given audio waveform, but
will be transcribed as any desired text by DeepSpeech [15].
In [7], the authors demonstrate that a 2% designed distortion
of speech can make state-of-the-art DNN models fail to
recognize the gender and identity of the speaker. In [12], the
authors show that such attacks are transferable to different and
unknown ASR models. Such attacks are dangerous, because
users do not expect that normal speech samples, such as
“hello”, could be translated into a malicious command by
an IoT device. Despite their extraordinary performance, these
methods have a clear limitation: since the perturbation is very
minor, it might not be correctly captured over the air by the
victim device and hence fail to attack. In [8], the authors report
that their method does not have an over-the-air threat, while
in [12], [7], the authors do not report the over-the-air attack
performance.
B. The Adversary’s Knowledge
One important factor of attacks is the adversary’s knowl-
edge. White-box attacks assume that the adversary knows all
details (e.g., design details and characteristics) of the target,
while black-box attacks assume that the adversary does not
have such information. Table I summarizes several attack
schemes discussed in this paper, including their type and the
required adversary’s knowledge. Hardware level attacks are
usually white-box attacks, because the device can be easily
dis-assembled and tested, e.g., in [4], the authors first test the
frequency response of the MEMS microphone and then take
advantage of its nonlinearity to conduct the attack. All OS
level attacks are white-box attacks. Note that all discussed
schemes [2], [9], [3] are targeting Android devices, which
is not surprising since Android is open-source and its inner
workings (e.g., authority management, inter-process commu-
nication) are well known. In contrast, the OS of Amazon Echo
is closed, which prevents it from being attacked. In fact, it is
difficult to perform black-box hardware and OS level attacks.
Different from the OS and hardware level attacks, practical
machine learning level attacks are usually black-box attacks,
because state-of-the-art ASR systems for IoT devices do not
release their detailed algorithms and the training sets. These
ASR systems run in the cloud, where an adversary may not
have access. However, machine learning attacks are able to
attack unknown ASR systems, e.g., in [11], [6], [12], the
authors successfully attack Google Voice without knowing
its details. This is because ASRs use similar (explicit or
implicit) acoustic features and models (e.g., network architec-
tures), which makes the machine learning adversarial examples
universal. This characteristic makes machine learning level
attacks more dangerous.
Another noteworthy point is that attacks can be combined
to become even more dangerous, e.g., GVS-Attacks [2] and
the approach described in [8] can be combined so that the
malware replay machine learning adversarial example sounds
like normal speech instead of a malicious command when it
finds an opportunity. Further, all attacks can be combined with
the one in [9] to become an interactive attack.
III. DEFENSE STRATEGIES
To defend and prevent OS level attacks, voice input and
output need to be decoupled since simultaneously using voice
input and output has been shown to affect users’ security [9],
[2], [3]. For example, AuDroid [13] has been proposed to man-
age the audio channel authority. By using different security
levels for different audio channel usage patterns, AuDroid can
resist a voice attack using the device’s built-in speaker [9],
[2]. However, AuDroid uses a speaker verification system
to defend external replay attacks, including hardware and
machine learning level attacks, which is not effective enough.
Therefore, AuDroid is only robust to OS level attacks.
One defense strategy seems promising for hardware and
machine learning level attacks is adversarial training, i.e.,
training an extra machine learning model that can classify
legitimate samples and adversaries. In [4], the authors use
support vector machine (SVM) to build such a classifier that
can fully defend against their proposed attack. Similarly, in [6],
the authors use logistic regression and achieve 99.8% defense
rate. A limitation of adversarial training is that it needs to
know the details of the attack technology or it needs to collect
a sufficient amount of adversarial examples. In practice, the
attackers will not publish their approaches and they can always
change the parameters (e.g., the modulation frequency in [5]
or the perturbation factor in [7]) to bypass the defense. Thus,
adversarial training is weak in preventing unknown attacks.
Other efforts [2], [6], [13] mention the possibility of using
speaker verification (SV) systems for defense. However, this is
not strong enough, because the SV system itself is vulnerable
to machine learning adversarial examples [7] and previously
recorded user speech [6], [1].
From the perspective of the defender, a strategy that can
resist various (and even unknown) attacks is expected. One
observation is that all existing attacks are based on the replay
attack: OS level and machine learning level attacks replay a
sound and hardware level attacks replay a designed signal. In
other words, the sound source is an electronic device (e.g.,
loudspeaker, signal generator) instead of a live speaker. On
the other hand, only the command from a live speaker should
be legitimate in practical applications. That is, if we can
determine if the received signal is from a live speaker,
we can defend all above mentioned and even unknown
attacks. To the best of our knowledge, such techniques are
non-trivial and have not been widely studied. As an approxi-
mation, in [10], the authors propose a virtual security button
(VSButton) that leverages Wi-Fi technology to detect indoor
human motions and voice commands are only accepted when
human motion is detected. The limitation of this work is
that voice commands are not necessarily accompanied with
detectable motion. In [18], the authors propose VAuth, which
collects the body-surface vibration of the user via a wearable
device and guarantees that the voice command is from the
user. The limitation of VAuth is the need for wearable devices
(i.e., earbuds, eyeglasses, and necklaces), which may be in-
convenient. Finally, in [1], the authors determine if the source
of voice commands is a loudspeaker via a magnetometer and
reject such commands. The limitation of this work is that this
works only up to 10cm, which is less than the usual human-
device distance. Further, this approach does not work for
unconventional loudspeakers and malicious signal generators.
In summary, existing defense techniques are able to address
only some vulnerabilities and therefore more powerful defense
techniques will be required to protect voice-driven IoT devices.
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